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As a subfield in economics, agricultural economics has an unusual
genesis and hence an unusual orientation. In production, its roots are
found in the study of agronomy and horticulture. Out of these disci-
plines grew studies and training in farm management. As Marshall’s
(1920) marginal analysis reached its climax, agricultural economics
was just beginning to emerge as a discipline in land-grant colleges
throughout the United States. It embraced marginal economic analysis,
comparative advantage, and competition as important insights into
market behavior. A hard-fought view began to emerge that the behav-
ior of those involved in agriculture throughout the world was consis-
tent with these basic economic concepts (summarized nicely in Schultz
1980). Yet, agricultural economics has always strived to help family
farms (in the United States or abroad) understand more fully their eco-
nomic environment. Thus, there has always been a normative dimen-
sion to agricultural economics as well (similar, perhaps, to finance in a
business school). In most other fields of economics, economists are not
so presumptuous as to suggest to economic agents how they should
optimize—unless it is the government.
Today, agricultural economics considers a broad set of issues and
behavior about resources, consumers, the environment, and policy
about food and fiber using the full range of current economic concepts
and methods. Likely second only to finance, agricultural economics
has embraced risk concepts as an essential ingredient to understanding
and prescribing behavior. It was an early entry into experimental eco-
nomics by measuring individual risk preferences and subjective proba-
bilities across a relatively broad set of agents (see Young et al. 1979;
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Nelson and Bessler 1989). The purpose of this chapter is to highlight a
few selective but central concepts, issues, and contributions about agri-
cultural behavior under risk. Although the central paradigm of eco-
nomic behavior is called expected utility maximization, the distinctions
among various models of behavior under risk will not be important.
Indeed, the relevant concepts and issues can be portrayed as a choice
among distributions based upon the mean (a measure of central ten-
dency) and the variance (a measure of dispersion). Such models can
often be rationalized as maximization of expected utility (Meyer 1987).
The main normative and positive issues are about choices that reduce
risk but, even more fundamentally, raise expected utility. It would be
impossible to cover all of the relevant topics, but this chapter will
address some issues central to agricultural economic research on risk
(see Robison and Barry 1987; Just and Pope 2002; and Caswell 1995
for more in-depth discussions).
It is useful to state at least my perception of a few generally rele-
vant economic facts about agriculture that serve as background:
1) Agricultural production is atomistic and is generally placed on
international markets. However, demand for raw agricultural
products is much more concentrated than final consumer demand
for food products. This implies that farms and final consumers
are generally price takers with international shocks readily trans-
mitted to agricultural markets. There is often an underlying sus-
picion by many agricultural producers that markets are unfair to
them because of this alleged asymmetric market power. 
2) Farm products have relatively price-inelastic demand and sup-
plies. Income elasticities of demand for many raw food goods are
relatively low compared to manufactures and services. Much has
been made of the inelastic demands and supplies in agriculture,
implying that shocks have greater price and income conse-
quences than in many sectors.
3) Production is heavily constrained by biological processes that
have long lags between the point in time in which a decision is
made and its ultimate consequences. This is particularly notable
in livestock production but is prevalent throughout agriculture.
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4) Production is heavily seasonal with definitive intra-seasonal
stages of production.
5) Investment decisions tend to have long physical and economic
lives. Land often has low alternative uses, except near cities.
6) Weather, disease, and pests (vicissitudes of nature) are direct and
pervasive in agriculture.
7) Government policy is omnipresent and often intrusive in market
outcomes (e.g., the Common Agricultural Policy in the European
Union, target prices, and subsidies in the United States). In
developed countries, policy generally attempts to raise farm
incomes and often raises consumer prices. In developing coun-
tries, policy often attempts to lower consumer prices.
8) Most of the demands on factors of production (inputs) in crops
are inherently spiked rather than distributed uniformly through-
out the season. This may imply an incentive to choose productive
activities that don’t compete for resources at a given point in
time.
9) Institutions for the ownership of factors of production and the
organization of production vary widely throughout the world. 
10) Evidence seems to suggest that yields are generally increasing
over time but that deviations about this trend are random (not
bunchy). However, prices are highly correlated (thus, bunchy) in
adjacent time periods. 
It is also useful to briefly state some stylized facts about U.S. agri-
culture.
1) Production occurs in predominantly single or family-run enter-
prises. Despite ever-increasingly larger farms, the last agricul-
tural census shows that over 85 percent of farms are “family
farms,” and true corporations (beyond small family-held corpo-
rations) make up only 0.4 percent of producers (Allen and Lueck
1998).
2) Structural changes in livestock production have been dramatic
and often resemble manufacturing with large scale and substan-
tial division of labor. There is substantial contract farming where
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farmers supply only some of the inputs and are paid incentive
contracts for producing. 
3) Production is increasingly specialized during the post-war
period, but multi-output production is still common. There
appear now to be substantial returns to specialization of produc-
tion. There is widespread innovation with continual technical
progress, and there are large numbers of strains of a given crop or
livestock available for production with different inherent charac-
teristics.
4) Many farms rent and own land; thus, contracting for the services
of land is ubiquitous.
5) Crop insurance and disaster relief have been the center of policy
debates in recent decades; price supports and production controls
were central in earlier times.
6) An interesting aspect of U.S. agricultural data is that there are lit-
tle farm level data available to researchers. There is a small set of
selective (not random) panels in a few states, but the data are
often of limited value for the questions studied and they are not
widely available. This constrains the kind of evidence that is
accumulated (Just and Pope 2001).
DIVERSIFICATION AS A RESPONSE TO RISK
Since at least the early 1950s, risk reduction through diversifica-
tion has received considerable attention. On the prescriptive side, agri-
cultural economists studied and proposed various diversification
strategies to reduce risk. However, there was a rather serious policy
aspect to this research. If farmers have significant opportunities to
reduce their risk, then perhaps some of the rationale for agricultural
policy needs to be rethought. The basic incentive for diversification is
widely known and can be discovered with a simple thought experi-
ment. Suppose that the variance of the net income from a 1,000-acre
corm farm is a number labeled σ2, while the expected return from the
farm is labeled μ. If another crop exists—say, soybeans, which has an
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identical and independent distribution to corn—then as Samuelson
(1967) has shown, the optimal choice for a risk-averse individual is to
plant 500 acres in each crop. Using variance to illustrate, this perfect
diversification will reduce the variance of income from σ2, when spe-
cialized in corn, to σ2/2 when the farm is diversified. The variance of
farm income is reduced in half by diversification, and a risk-averse
producer would presumably find this attractive. This is the incentive
for diversification: low returns in one enterprise may be mitigated by
high returns in the second enterprise. Indeed, if there are N identically
and independently distributed enterprise returns, the variance can be
further reduced to σ2/N by putting 500/N acres in each enterprise (this
assumes that there are no economies or diseconomies of scale). In
cases of more general distributional settings (uneven means, variances,
and nonzero covariances), there is a marginal benefit from diversifica-
tion (reduction of the variance) and a marginal cost (reduction in
expected or average income by not specializing in the activity or enter-
prise with the largest expected return).
The standard approach to economic behavior up to 1950 implied
specialization: choose the enterprise with the highest expected return.
This is equivalent to maximizing any increasing function of expected
wealth or maximizing
(6.1) U = u(W0 + μ),
where μ is expected net income from farming and W0 is initial certain
wealth. Thus, if confronted with the choice of producing corn, which is
expected to yield $25 per acre, and hay, which is expected to yield $15
per acre, a prudent farmer maximizing expected wealth would special-
ize in the production of corn. However, in 1952, E.O. Heady argued
that farmers likely had distaste for risk (risk aversion) as measured by
the variability or variance of net income. Given estimates of individual
enterprise variances and covariances, farmers can analytically choose
the crop or enterprise combination that minimizes total farm variance
of income. This procedure focuses on the benefits from diversification
and highly favors diversification rather than specialization as an opti-
mal decision. Knowing that enterprise expected returns will likely be
unequal, Heady also discussed choices that minimize variance for a
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given expected income appropriate for any mean-variance utility func-
tion of the form 
(6.2) U = u(W0 + μ, σ2),
where μ is expected farm income and enters utility u positively, σ2 is
the variance of farm income, and U is utility (expected utility). In this
chapter, an individual is “risk responsive” when one includes the vari-
ance in a maximization such as in Equation (6.2). A person is “risk-
averse” when increased variance reduces utility. In the summary in
Young et al. (1979), most of the individual farmers whose preferences
were elicited were not risk-neutral for some decisions—a majority
were risk-averse, and some were mixed, meaning that for some deci-
sions a person might be risk-averse and for others risk preferring or
neutral.
In Heady’s analysis, expected farm income is: μ = h1π1 + h2π2,
where h is the proportion of total land or investment in enterprise 1 and
π1 and π2 are expected returns per unit of land or investment on enter-
prises 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, the variance of farm income for
two enterprises is 
(6.3)
where  is the variance of enterprise, 1 income and is the vari-
ance of enterprise 2 income, and σ12 is the covariance of the two
incomes. Heady found that if a typical Iowa corn farm diversified by
halving corn acreage and correspondingly increasing hay production,
variance of income could be reduced substantially without a significant
reduction of expected income. This is because the correlation between
hay and corn income is relatively small, 0.45. Thus, large random
draws in one crop’s income are often offset with low random draws in
the other crops income. This incentive becomes most pronounced for
enterprises whose outcomes tend to be independent or are negatively
correlated with similar means. When expected returns are very differ-
ent in the two enterprises, then specialization of production becomes
more likely. 
Subsequent writers added the possibility of renting in or out land
(Johnson 1967). In this case, the square root of the variance or the stan-
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dard deviation of income can be linearly reduced by choosing to pro-
duce fewer (or less) risky enterprises and engaging in more safe
activities. Examples of the latter are cash lease of land and investing in
a risk-free asset in the case of capital. In cases where the cash lease or
risk-free rate exceeds the expected return from risky enterprises, then
specialization in the risk-free asset is predicted under risk aversion (see
Equation (6.2)). In cases where the expected risky return exceeds the
cash lease rate, firms combine the two according to their tastes for risk
(risk aversion). A similar conclusion can be obtained for investment
capital among risk-free and risky assets. 
Many authors attempted to use quadratic programming or an
equivalent mathematical programming model to identify the risk-effi-
cient (minimizing variance for a given mean) set of enterprise choices
for farms, regions, or countries. The main advantage is that quadratic
programming models of farms could integrate many production con-
straints on firm behavior. For example, perhaps machinery and labor
supplies were limited throughout the months of a growing season. In
addition, they could include many policy constraints or incentives,
such as land set-asides. However, the normative and positive content
(what farms should do and what they do) of these models is only as
good as the models themselves. Failure to reflect individual prefer-
ences, beliefs, or constraints will yield recommendations or insights
that may be irrelevant to a decision maker. Additional effort is needed
to understand what decision makers actually do in their response to
risk.
Lin, Dean, and Moore (1974) attempted to test whether program-
ming models incorporating response to risk (variance) were better than
risk-neutral models. Using elicitation techniques, the preference func-
tions of a small set of farmers were estimated. Many of these prefer-
ence functions implied that the mean and variance of incomes should
enter into farmers’ objective functions. Mathematical programming
models using these general objective functions were superior at pre-
dicting what farmers actually did when compared to models based
solely on maximizing expected farm income. Though by today’s stan-
dards the techniques and evidence used to advance their argument
might be rather unconvincing, it was and is an important paper in posi-
tive economics, convincing many that risk was fundamental to under-
standing behavior in agriculture. This paper confirmed empirically
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what other researchers had suspected: “risk aversion was superior to
risk neutrality for explaining behavior” (e.g., Officer and Halter 1968). 
Spatial Diversification
Soon after Heady’s work, Emery Castle (1954) noted that area
diversification was almost as important as crop diversification. Indeed,
spatial diversification apparently has been a successful strategy for risk
reduction since medieval times (McCloskey 1976). Formulae for the
variance across farms always involve the covariance (see Equation (3))
or correlation, which is the covariance divided by the product of the
square root of the variances. Spatial diversification becomes particu-
larly useful if the correlation across farms is sharply reduced as dis-
tance between the plots increases.
Jensen (1961) argued that spatial diversification was an important
managerial technique open to dryland farms in the Great Plains
because of idiosyncratic weather across areas. Thompson and Wilson
(1994) argued that one of the primary reasons that Mexican ejido com-
munal farmers resisted privatization of grazing land is that yields are
variable with highly idiosyncratic weather patterns. Farmers could
readily reduce the variance of their yields by scattering production spa-
tially. Of course, spatial diversification has a cost in terms of expected
return (increased travel costs), but apparently the benefits are sufficient
to make it viable.
Davis et al. (1997) found that the correlation between yields of dif-
ferent peach orchards decreased 2.28 percent for each mile of separa-
tion, which could be a significant factor in the pattern of operation. It
should also be mentioned that larger farms often have a significant
advantage due to very subtle advantages in diversification. Many
farms, such as orchards, have different responses at different eleva-
tions. Thus, a farm can in some cases gain a significant reduction in the
variance while having contiguous plots by diversifying by elevation.
However, more research is required to know how extensively spatial
diversification techniques are used. 
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Econometric Models of Risk Response
There was an increasing awareness in the decade of the 1970s that
the evidence via programming models of risk-averse or risk-responsive
behavior was not on sound statistical footing. In mathematical pro-
gramming models, parameters are usually estimated and treated as
exact. Hence, there was not a readily deducible metric to decide when
something like the null hypothesis of “no aversion or risk response”
could be rejected. As with other fields of econometrics, programming
models gave way to the search for econometric evidence. These mod-
els often made very simple assumptions about constraints, but the
results were more easily amenable to inference. The ability to incorpo-
rate more complex constraints on behavior in econometric models may
imply that more of the old programming constraints will find their way
into econometric models (Andrews 2001).
For over four decades, agricultural economists had been using com-
puters to estimate short run supply functions essentially of the form 
(6.4)
where μp is the expected price (or yield, or both) of the crop or live-
stock, A would be acreage or supply, z represents other variables, and
the b0 – b2 are constants to be estimated econometrically. One promi-
nent example of such an approach is the adaptive expectation model
discussed in undergraduate econometrics texts. The coefficient of b1 is
presumed to be positive and the larger the magnitude of b1, the more
elastic is the supply.
Around 1970, some argued that this approach was limiting because
it didn’t capture risk response. Behrman (1968) incorporated risk
response in agriculture as he studied crop production in Thailand. This
is a large and careful study. More importantly, a regression was esti-
mated of the following form:
(6.5)
where μp is an estimate of expected price (yield or both),  is an esti-
mated of the variance (or standard deviation) of price, yield, or both, z
represents other variables (for example, the means and variances of
0 1 2μ ,pA b b b z= + +
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substitutes and complements), and the b0 – b3 are constants to be esti-
mated econometrically. Behrman found that in a preponderance of the
cases, b1 was estimated to be positive and statistically different from
zero, indicating that supply curves are upward-sloping in expected
price. In a majority of cases, b2 was estimated to be negative and statis-
tically different from zero. This was particularly true for upland crops
that are sold on the market, unlike rice, which is often consumed by the
farm family. Behrman concludes that “The estimated responses to the
relative standard deviations do provide further support, however, for
the hypothesis that the agricultural sectors in underdeveloped countries
respond negatively to risks” (p. 336). Six years later, another work on
risk response was very influential. Just (1974), using a Bayesian
approach, formalized the estimation and specification of the mean and
variance of revenue, including complementary and substitute crops,
and estimated an acreage response model like Equation (6.4) for coun-
ties in California. He concluded that there was convincing statistical
evidence that b2 is negative for many crops. Thus, it appeared that risk
response was not limited to developing countries.
A number of papers during the next three decades sought to deter-
mine whether a model like Equation (6.5) captures something that
Equation (6.4) does not. Indeed, there has been mounting evidence of
risk-responsive behavior across many commodities, countries, and
aggregations. Table 6.1 summarizes a sample of these studies. Though
the elasticities measuring risk response are often low in absolute value
(column 5), they usually have the expected sign (negative), and risk
coefficients are statistically significant (column 3). In some cases, the
response to the risk of competing crops can be captured (column 4).
For example, more corn acreage may be planted when the risk in soy-
beans increases. Various measures of risk can be constructed (column
6), and this issue continues to be a matter of research and controversy.
In many cases, both μp and  are estimated using weights of past
observations. This is called adaptive in the table. In this case, risk is
measured by a backward looking mechanism; surprises in the past
affect the expectation of the future variance of price, yields, or revenue
per acre. 
To illustrate, μp might be a weighting of the previous three years of
prices with weights summing to one. Similarly, is estimated by
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and Holt 1996). More sophisticated single-equation approaches use
long memory geometrically declining weights (Just 1974), ARCH/
GARCH with conditional or time varying variances, and/or rational
risk (Aradhyula and Holt 1989; Myers 1989; Holt and Aradhyula 1990,
1998; Holt and Moschini 1992). Rational risk implies that the mean
and variances implied by the model match the market data given avail-
able information. One must build up a structural model of the supply
and the demand side of the market to yield expected price and the vari-
ance of price given available information. Then, the restrictions
implied by the rational expectation hypothesis must be imposed. One
of the most impressive but complex applications of rational risk is
found in Holt and Aradhyula (1998), where a carefully specified model
of the broiler market is estimated. Risk-responsive behavior was evi-
dent. More complicated still would be to estimate a complete model of
production or supply and inputs demanded (factor demands), such as
chemicals, labor, land, and machinery and product supply using ratio-
nal expectations of the first two moments of price. A number of authors
have estimated such models without explicit complicated expectational
schemes and found evidence of risk-responsive behavior (Antle 1987;
Chavas and Holt 1996; Love and Buccola 1991; Saha, Shumway, and
Talpaz 1994; Coyle 1999).
In summary, the available econometric evidence suggests that
firms rebalance their production portfolios such that when the per-
ceived risks of an enterprise increase, farms substitute toward less risky
enterprises. Taken as a whole, this evidence is very persuasive that
these models capture something. However, for some, there are still res-
ervations about the explanation of risk aversion for these risk effects.
That is, is it possible that Equation (6.5) merely picks up a nonlinearity,
lags, or aggregation problems (e.g., Pope 1981)? Part of the reason for
this skepticism is the very success of the approach. When Equation
(6.5) is applied to highly aggregated data where risk measures are sub-
stantially compromised and/or in markets where reasonably good
futures markets exist, it still seems to work well. The question then is
not one of insufficient evidence, but of interpretation of the evidence. 














Behrman (1968) Rice, corn, casaba, Ad Yes N.A.e Small but 
negative
3-year std. dev. 
(moving)
Just (1974) Grain, cotton, A Yes Yes Not calculated Adaptive like 
(infinite)
Lin (1977) Wheat, A Yes N.A. Not calculated 3-year std. dev.
Estes et al. (1981) Potato, A Yes N.A. Not calculated Adaptive





Yes N.A. Not calculated Adaptive
Aradhyula and Holt (1989) Broilers Yes Yes –0.045 GARCH
rational
Holt and Aradhyula (1990) Broilers Yes 0.232, –0.012, 
–0.046
GARCH
Chavas and Holt (1996) Corn and soybean, A Yes No Not reported Adaptive
Love and Buccola (1991) Corn and soybean 
system, A
Yes No N.A. Yes
Pope and Just (1991) Potato and sugar beet, A Yes Yes Not reported Adaptive
von Massow and 
Weersink (1993)
White beans, corn 
soybeans, wheat, A
Yes Yes –0.073 to –0.220 Adaptive
Saha, Shumway, and 
Talpaz (1994)
Wheat system Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
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Holt (1994) Corn, A Yes Yes –0.018 Rational
Duffy, Shalishali, and 
Kinnucan (1994)
Cotton, corn, and 
soybean, A
Yes No Not reported Adaptive
Krause, Lee, and Koo 
(1995)
Wheat, A Yes N.A. –0.062 to 0.003 Adaptive
Krause and Koo (1996) Wheat, barley, 
flaxseed, and oil 
sunflower, A
Yes Yes –0.05 to –0.01 Adaptive
Tronstad and McNeill 
(1989)
Sow farrowing Yes Yes –0.0013 to –0.164 Downside
Bar-Shira, Just, and 
Zilberman (1997)
Crop system Yes Yes N.A. Adaptive
Coyle (1999) Crops and livestock 
system
Yes No Not reported Adaptive
aOften a single paper includes a variety of specifications. “Yes” means that some of the risk parameters were significant.
b Often a single paper includes a variety of specifications. Thus, the elasticities reported are an attempt to convey approximate risk
response.
c Adaptive here is used very loosely. It is intended to imply a weighting scheme where the weights sum to one. Some “adaptive” used
polynomial lags rather than geometric declining; some use simple fixed weighting schemes.
d A = crop acreage or similar spatial measure.
e N.A. means “not applicable.”
f f-m and m-r are margins: respectively, farm to mill and mill to retail.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from selected cited references.
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Other Forms of Diversification
Another risk-reducing activity is to diversify family labor. Mishra
and Goodwin (1997) find a significant positive relationship between
the coefficient of variation of farm income (standard deviation divided
by the mean) and off-farm employment. Thus, when farm income is
more variable, one risk-reducing strategy is to apply more of one’s
labor portfolio to safer off-farm income-generating activities. Further,
farm operators who receive large payments from government farm pro-
grams are less likely to supply off-farm labor. Both of these findings
are consistent with farmers balancing risks in a portfolio generated by
owner labor and owner capital.
Not only can a farmer self-insure through reducing labor alloca-
tions to risky endeavors, but capital can be allocated to safe invest-
ments as well. Mishra and Morehart (2001) calculate that off-farm
financial assets in 1995 for the United States were 18 percent of total
assets for farm families. This is up from 14 percent in 1990. Thus,
farms are becoming more diversified outside of agriculture. One way
to view these data is that agriculture is more risky so farmers are
increasingly diversifying outside of agriculture in order to reduce the
risk of total wealth or income. Perhaps recent market events have
reversed that trend. 
Diversification and Farm Size
Because the foundation of much agricultural policy in the United
States historically has hinged on the survival of the family farm, one
issue of concern is the relationship of scale and risk. Unlike the portfo-
lio approach, there may be substantial economies of scale in produc-
tion; that is, as a farm produces more of a particular crop, marginal and
average costs of production fall. Economies of scope may also arise,
meaning there are cost advantages to diversification. Part of the reason
for such economies of scope is that there are inputs that are productive
across products. For example, a tractor can be utilized to produce a
variety of crops, especially when they don’t compete at the same time
for services. Economies of scope imply that expected utility with two
products is greater than expected utility when specialized. These can
come from the diversification motive discussed above or from cost
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advantages from public-like inputs. Economies of scale promote spe-
cialization while economies of scope promote diversification. Thus,
there are three relevant effects: diversification in response to risk with
no scale effects, scale economies in enterprises, and economies of
scope due to cost advantages in jointly producing two or more prod-
ucts.
Attempting to empirically untangle these three effects is difficult,
and there is not a satisfactory conclusion. Econometric studies provide
some evidence that larger farms are more diversified, ceteris paribus.
Further, wealthier farms, ceteris paribus, have less diversification
(Pope 1976; Pope and Prescott 1980; Dunn and Williams 2000; Zenger
and Schurle 1981). Pope (1976), using factor analysis for California
farms, found evidence that there is a combination of minimum efficient
scale and economies of scope due to spreading the services of fixed
inputs across time. 
However, looking broadly across this literature, one is struck by
the large volume of prescriptive literature on optimal diversification
and the relatively small set that positively examines behavior. Though
there is little doubt that the principles of diversification are always
potentially important, exactly where they are used is still a matter of
some debate. For example, perhaps farm diversification across enter-
prises due to risk aversion is relatively unimportant in explaining farm
behavior.
If initially an optimal portfolio of actions or investments is chosen,
then policy that reduces the risk in a particular agricultural commodity
will see greater supply of that commodity (and at the expense of oth-
ers). Thus, a well-meaning policy attempting to assist wheat farmers in
the northern plains because of variable profitability may have the unin-
tended consequence of increased production and greater demand for
help in the future. Further, it is apparent that behavioral and market
responses to risk may be diminished in response to a public policy that
attempts to reduce risk. For example, diversification may fall if the
government provides a safety net for farms.
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RISK REDUCTION AND INPUT USE
One can surely view the entire portfolio choice as one of choosing
inputs, such as land allocations for crops. However, one aspect of input
choice applies to specialized or diversified farms and asks what the dis-
tributional consequences are of input choice. To illustrate the issue,
suppose that a farm is specialized in the production of corn. Corn has a
production function that depends on an input, h. Both its mean output
and the variance of output depend on h. That is, μ = μ(h); σ2 = σ2(h).
What might a farmer do in choosing how much of this input to apply?
Just as in diversification, there is a marginal benefit in that expected
output would increase. For example, if fertilizer is applied, we expect it
to raise output or to have a positive expected marginal product gener-
ally. At some point, it is expected that additional fertilizer will diminish
output (negative expected marginal product). If the farmer’s only con-
cern were expected profit μ, the farmer would choose fertilizer such
that the expected marginal benefit equaled the cost (price) per unit of
the fertilizer. In which case, economists say that a farm chooses inputs
such that the expected marginal revenue product is equal to marginal
factor price. That is, the marginal benefit of input use is equal to its
marginal cost.
However, if the farmer is risk-averse, there is concern with how
increasing input allocations might alter the variance of profit. If the
decision maker is risk-averse, then increasing the variance of profit
will reduce utility. The important question is how each input contrib-
utes to expected profit and the variance of profit at the margin. We will
call inputs that reduce the variance of profits at the margin risk-reduc-
ing, while inputs that increase the variance of profits are risk-increas-
ing. If an input is risk-reducing and the farm is risk-averse, there will
be an additional marginal benefit from using more of it than would be
implied by maximizing expected profit. This is a self-insuring tech-
nique. Firms might have more machinery or labor than would seem
advisable based upon average marginal product because using more of
it reduces risk. Farms might use more pesticides than would seem prof-
itable on average because of its self-insuring capabilities. A little
reflection shows that irrigation may perform that function. Irrigation
often virtually lops off the lower tail of the distribution of yields; nec-
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essarily, it reduces the variance (and raises the average) of crop yields.
However, land is likely risk-increasing under this definition: adding
more acres of corn increases the variance of profits (and expected
profit). The policy significance of describing agricultural technology is
apparent. If agricultural decision makers believe that the environment
is more risky, then they may use more of inputs that lead to degradation
of the environment when the inputs are risk-reducing.
The motivation for answering the question about how inputs affect
the distribution of output comes from two sources. First, it is relevant
to prescribing optimal input use to farms. It is particularly relevant in
developing countries. If a modern variety of a crop is chosen, there are
often very large variations in output if there are modest variations in
inputs like fertilizer. This is often in contrast to native varieties, which
have a number of resistances to input variations. Secondly, there are
many environmental issues regarding the use of modern chemicals. 
Roumasset (1976) considered rice production in the Philippines in
1971–1972 and found that the green revolution was not as successful
as expected. Farmers often adopted “miracle rice” varieties, but they
did not use the recommended amount of nitrogenous fertilizer. It was
hypothesized that less than the recommended level of fertilizer was
used because of risk aversion. After estimating risk preference func-
tions and the random properties of technology, Roumasset discovered
that risk neutrality was more consistent with observed behavior than
was risk aversion, contrary to the Officer and Halter (1968) and Lin,
Dean, and Moore (1974) conclusion that risk aversion often explained
behavior better than risk neutrality.
As mentioned earlier, most attention was focused on chemical
inputs. The empirical results were often mixed, but there is no reason
for inputs to behave similarly across soil qualities, climatic conditions,
and crops. Secondly, results vary because of many methodological
issues associated with functional forms and estimation of higher order
moments. Regev, Gotsch, and Rieder (1997) found significant evi-
dence that fungicides are risk-increasing at low levels of rainfall, but
found no conclusive evidence of nitrogen being risk-reducing or risk-
increasing. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) found evidence that fer-
tilizer and pesticides may be risk-reducing. Mixed results on pesticides
are found in Carlson (1979), Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994), and
Hurd (1994). There seems to be a growing consensus that there is no
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evidence that pesticides are risk-reducing. Thus far, agricultural econo-
mists are only beginning to build a consistent body of findings upon
which to infer a coherent set of stylized facts about risk-reducing/
increasing inputs (Antle 1983; Griffiths and Anderson 1982; Hall and
Moffit 1985; Just and Pope 1979). The most clear-cut evidence seems
to come from experimental plots commonly studied by agricultural
experiment stations throughout the world, but there are questions about
how these data apply to actual farming experience under less con-
trolled situations.
CROP INSURANCE
As economists have thought about the new economics of uncer-
tainty, one of the early insights was that insurance markets rationally
could not exist unless coercion was involved or unless there was free
choice with significant risk aversion. Excluding coercion, a risk-neu-
tral person will maximize expected wealth and therefore will pay at
most the expected loss due to acts of nature. That is, if there is a 0.001
probability that fire will destroy a $200,000 building in a given year,
the largest insurance premium a risk-neutral individual would pay is
the expected loss, E(L), which equals $200. Insurance provision
involves marketing, adjusting, and other monitoring costs denoted by
c. Let this total cost of insurance provision be C = c + E(L). No insur-
ance market could exist unless people are willing to pay at least C for
insurance. The amount an individual is willing to pay beyond E(L) is
called the risk premium, ρ. The risk premium is zero for risk-neutral
individuals and positive for those who are risk-averse. Thus, a risk-
averse individual is willing and able to purchase insurance if the provi-
sion costs are less than the premium, or c ≤ ρ. The left side of the ine-
quality is the supply price, and the right side is the demand price. No
insurance market can exist (for c > 0) without compulsion unless mar-
ket participants are risk-averse such that they are willing to pay for the
costs, c. Any risk-averse individual would surely purchase “fair insur-
ance” where the insurance premium is equal to the expected loss. This
is a simple initial insight into a necessary condition for the existence of
an insurance market.
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A second insight comes from the notion of insurability. Insurers
generally are thought to have little exposure to risk if they have a large
number of independent contracts. In this case, the payouts (indemni-
ties) will thus be remarkably predictable (low variance). This is evident
from the law of large numbers in probability. Using this indemnity
data, the insurance product can be readily priced and most of the com-
petitive assumptions can ensue. These conditions for insurability hold
for life insurance and fire insurance. These conditions rarely hold for
acts of nature to agriculture (hail insurance is an exception), which can
often be catastrophic. Insurers of acts of nature in the Midwest would
have a highly correlated portfolio if the insured losses were due to
drought. Thus, the liabilities could be large one year and low the next,
implying a high variance of the return. This may mean that the proba-
bility of ruin for an insurer would be substantial, leading to risk-
responsive behavior by insuring firms (Duncan and Myers 2000).
However, there are reinsurance markets and other means to trade away
some of the risk in a risky undertaking. 
It appears that no multiple-peril private crop insurance markets
have emerged (e.g., see Glauber and Collins 2002). Due either to issues
of insurability or just plain old rent seeking, policy has focused in
recent decades on the provision of federally organized and provided
crop insurance. To illustrate the essence of the program, a farm might
select the 0.75 option. When yields are 75 percent of approved pro-
gram yield, this triggers a payment from the government.
In 1980, the “Crop Insurance Improvement Act” was passed in the
United States, allowing the private sector to sell multiple-peril federal
crop insurance (MPCI) with a subsidized premium. Since that time,
five additional acts have been passed to extend and reform the federal
program. Federal subsidies have risen to around $1.4 billion. Liabilities
have grown sevenfold since 1980 to around $35 billion, also showing
the tremendous growth in the program. During the 1980s and much of
the 1990s, the ratio of indemnities/total premiums (ignoring the gov-
ernment subsidy) or loss ratio was greater than 1, indicating that the
program was actuarially unsound. Because of enormous policy interest
in the program, significant amounts of intellectual effort, computer
time, and ink were spent studying crop insurance.
Crop insurance has also been a focus of international attention as
countries around the world study the viability of similar programs
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(both Canada and Japan have programs similar to the United States; see
the bibliography of Coble and Knight 2002). Because of the federal
subsidy, this insurance is more than “fair” to some farmers. Thus, even
a risk-neutral farmer may strictly prefer the insurance. Thus, risk tools
are relevant, but insurance purchase isn’t prima facie evidence of risk
aversion, as it would be in a laissez-faire market for insurance.
There are many possible reasons for the excess losses, including that
government may wish to transfer wealth to agriculture. However, using
the best available actuarial methods, there are good reasons to expect the
program to fail. At least part of the answer is well known to economists.
When farmers have more information than those setting the rates (asym-
metric information), moral hazard and adverse selection may occur.
These will be explored conceptually first and then empirically. 
Adverse Selection
Suppose that rate makers have access to average actuarial data and
set what is known as a pooled rate, that rate where the average loss ratio
is 1. Suppose also that there is heterogeneity; that is, some farms have a
high probability of loss below the insured level, while other farms have
a low probability of loss. Farms that are good risks (low probability of
a payout) in that the probability of yields falling below the threshold
value is low, will find the price of insurance too high because it is based
upon the average farm’s probability. They will not purchase the insur-
ance. Farms that are poor risks will find the average rate attractive and
will self-select into the insurance program. Thus, risks that are adverse
to the long-run viability of the program select in and low risks select
out. This implies that the government will lose money and may wish to
raise rates. If rates are raised, some of the good-risk farms will exit the
program. Again, the program will lose money.
The incentives to purchase insurance are now threefold under risk-
aversion: 1) the incentive to participate based upon an increase in
expected profit due to the subsidy, 2) an incentive due to risk aversion
(reduced risk), and 3) an incentive due adverse selection. One way to
calculate the three effects is as follows: the first calculates the increase
in expected profit from being insured, the second calculates the differ-
ence in the risk premium due to being insured, and the third follows
from the increase in expected indemnity due to adverse selection. Each
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of these provides incentive to participate. The greater the subsidy, the
larger the first incentive. Greater risk aversion implies greater incentive
to purchase insurance. Finally, for the adverse selection effect, higher-
risk firms will benefit because of larger expected indemnities than typ-
ical. The third incentive will imply that the expected loss to insurers
increases with participation in insurance by high-risk producers. 
Adverse selection need not be a problem if the insurance provider
can monitor or know the nature of the heterogeneous firm. Experience
rating is an example of trying to adjust premiums for the type of firm
demanding insurance.
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard implies another type of asymmetric information.
Here, knowledge of the insured’s actions is hidden from the insurer
when comparing pre- and post-insurance behavior. The most extreme
form of hidden action is arson, but more subtle behaviors involve tak-
ing inappropriate care or effort. Antitheft devices might not be pur-
chased if a car is fully insured. Regarding health insurance, an insured
person might see a doctor more often than if uninsured. For MCPI, the
opportunities to change behavior if insured are many. Thus, a fourth
incentive to purchase insurance relates to moral hazard: fewer inputs
may be applied when insured. This will save costs and will increase the
probability of collecting indemnity payments. Again, if the provider
can monitor behavior and pay indemnities according to deviations
from best practice, moral hazard need not be an issue. Monitoring is
expensive and difficult to do, except for obvious behaviors. 
Many policy proposals have tried to deal with the moral hazard
problem. One such program makes payments based upon area yields
rather than individual yields. In this case, adverse selection and moral
hazard are virtually eliminated. However, the amount of insurance that
an individual receives is dependent on how the farm outcomes are cor-
related with the area outcomes. If a farm risk is largely idiosyncratic,
then the areawide insurance will provide little benefit to the farm. 
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Empirical Results 
Consider first the demand for insurance. Empirical work on crop
insurance demand has used simulation methods assuming particular
characteristics and risk preferences of the farm (e.g., Kramer and Pope
1982; Mapp and Jeter 1988) or econometric techniques (e.g., Gardner
and Kramer 1986; Goodwin 1993; Barnett and Skees 1995; Richards
2000; Vandeveer and Loehman 1994; Coble et al. 1996). A central
question is how does the demand for insurance respond to various
characteristics of the farm and the contract and insurance premiums?
These studies find that the demand for crop insurance is very price
(premium) inelastic despite wide variation in crops, regions, subsidies,
and in the nature of the program (contract). The 1998 ad hoc disaster
relief bill provided for an additional 30 percent of subsidies for pre-
mium subsidy. Studying this change, Coble and Barnett (1999) find the
price elasticity of demand to be approximately 0.65 in terms of acres
insured. That is, a 1 percent decrease in premiums would increase acres
insured by 0.65 percent. 
Empirical work on moral hazard and adverse selection is much
more difficult than measuring insurance demand elasticities. A number
of studies find substantial scope for or direct evidence of adverse selec-
tion (Goodwin 1994; Ker and McGowan 2000; Luo, Skees, and
Marchant 1994; Just, Calvin, and Quiggin 1999). Adverse selection is a
large problem in the program for at least three reasons. First, farmers
can choose to participate knowing early spring soil moisture and
weather forecasts. For example, soil moisture at enrollment and long-
run weather forecasts can be beneficial. Using El Niño/La Niña
weather patterns can exacerbate the adverse selection problem for
insurers (Ker and McGowan 2000). This implies that farmers often
have more information than rate makers. Second, there is great hetero-
geneity, and farmers may choose to insure particular parcels of their
land. Third, the U.S. program is marked by procedures that imply large
difficulties. For example, a farm without an approved yield history
could use the county average. If a farm’s yields were substantially
lower than this average, there would be a large indemnity paid and rel-
atively small premium received, leading to program losses.
Regarding moral hazard, Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) esti-
mated chemical use for Midwest corn producers. They estimated that
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insurance participation in MPCI led to increased use of nitrogen, herbi-
cides, and pesticides. Smith and Goodwin (1996) examined Kansas
dryland wheat production and obtained opposite results. Firms pur-
chasing insurance significantly reduced total chemical input. Babcock
and Hennessy (1996) argued that using reasonable measures of risk
aversion and estimates of technology, insurance implied very modest
reductions in fertilizer usage. Coble et al. (1996) found evidence of
increased yield shortfalls for those insured. Taken as a whole, these
results suggest that moral hazard is a potentially serious problem. 
There is also research that substantiates that the uninsured behave
differently from the insured, but that does not attribute this to a particu-
lar explanation. Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton (1993) examined
typical revenue and input share equations and noted that revenue was
statistically less for insured farms. No corresponding significant results
were found for inputs. The impacts on crops grown (likely moral haz-
ard) are substantial and likely clearer. Glauber (1999) estimates that a
revenue insurance program for North Dakota durum wheat producers
led to a 25 percent increase in production. Wu (1999) estimates that
crop insurance for corn causes corn acreage to increase. Keaton, Skees,
and Long (1999) estimate that a 10 percent increase in crop insurance
participation increased an increased planted area of 6 major crops of
5.9 million acres. This is an unusually large response and likely overes-
timates the response to crop insurance alone (Glauber and Collins
2002). Goodwin and Vandeveer (2000) estimate a 2.2–3.3 percent
increase in corn and soybean acreage planted. Orden (2001) estimates
that that would increase production by 0.28–4.1 percent. Finally, if pro-
duction increases, price must fall. Babcock and Hart (2000) conclude
that the elimination of crop insurance subsidies for corn would increase
price by $0.02–$0.16 per bushel.
To summarize, it seems that there is every expectation to believe
that adverse selection and moral hazard will be a problem in the MPCI.
The dates allowed for enrollment, the fact that separate fields can be
enrolled, and the difficulties of monitoring complex behavior all con-
tribute to these possibilities. Though the empirical research is not as
broad and uniform as desired, the available evidence suggests that the
two economic problems identified with provision of insurance under
asymmetric information are alive and well in MPCI (Coble and Knight
2002).
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As this section concludes, a question arises: Should the govern-
ment be insuring yields in the first place? First, if the elasticity of
demand is unity, yields may vary considerably but total revenue (price
times quantity) is fixed. This suggests that if policy wants to provide
some safety net for farms rather than transfer wealth to them, then rev-
enue insurance may be a preferred policy to yield insurance. Second, it
is far from clear that there is a strong demand for agricultural crop
insurance. This is to be distinguished from a strong demand for a sub-
sidy or transfer to farmers. 
HEDGING/FORWARD MARKETS
As discussed in virtually every textbook on economic theory or
practice, hedging can reduce exposure to risk. Examples abound of
markets for risk. Many commodities are listed on the Chicago Board
of Trade, and a number of instruments are relevant. Though using
futures markets is available, there is no reason to suspect that this is
the efficient mechanism to trade risk. Often the efficient mechanism
for a farm to shed risk is a forward contract. A forward contract is
merely a contract at a negotiated price today for delivery in the future.
A futures market is an organized forward market specifying delivery
at a particular date, quantity, and grade of the commodity at a speci-
fied place (e.g., Chicago). However, the basic advantages and risks of
farm hedging can be told equivalently with either a forward or a
futures market. I shall use the latter because it is commonly discussed
in most texts in microeconomics. 
A farmer plants corn in the spring and knows that the futures price
is $3.00 for September corn. This is the current price for future deliv-
ery of corn in September. If the futures price converges to the actual
price of corn on the spot market, then when fall comes, both prices will
be equal. These prices might be equal to $4.00 or $2.00. They are ran-
dom when viewed from the point of view of the farmer in the spring.
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Now consider the following three transactions for a bushel of corn
assuming the fall price is $x:
Summing yields +$3.00. The farmer, by placing the hedge, has
received a certain $3.00 for corn rather than the random price $x. If
risk-averse and if the futures market is fair or unbiased (expected spot
is the futures price), farmers would surely prefer to use the futures mar-
ket. The farmer could forget risk aversion and use the certain $3.00
price signal to decide how much acreage to plant in corn. Summarizing
and generalizing the above example, farm profit using the futures mar-
ket can be described equivalently as: 
(6.6) profit = total revenue in the spot market – costs of production + 
 (futures price – spot price) × (quantity of output hedged),
or equivalently,
(6.7) profit = (unhedged output) × (spot price) – costs of production + 
 (hedged output) × (futures price), 
when the futures price converges to the spot price at any point in time.
The example and concepts discussed above bring about four
important issues. First, the separation result of production from hedg-
ing does not extend to the amount hedged; it depends on the magnitude
of risk aversion. However, when production itself is uncertain, the
farmer does not know how much of her crop is hedged by a given
quantity sold forward in the spring. Second, there is basis risk where
basis is the difference between the spot price and the futures price at
any point in time and in the place where production takes place. Third,
how should a hedge change over time in reaction to new information
and what are the time series properties of prices? Dynamic or rolling






actions costs in using the futures market (fees/margin calls etc.). These
issues are reviewed in sequence.
The Hedge
When production is certain, when there is no basis risk, and when
firms are risk-averse, one of the first observations involving the opti-
mal hedge is that it will be less (greater) than output produced as the
expected spot price is greater (less) than the futures price. This states
that in order for a risk-averse firm to be rewarded for risk taking by
selling more futures contracts than it has output (speculating), it must
be true that the futures price is greater than expected spot price. When
the futures or forward price predicts unbiasedly the spot price, output
will be completely hedged because there is no incentive to speculate in
either the cash or futures markets. Thus, a key question is whether
futures or forward prices unbiasedly predict spot prices. The available
evidence is mixed. However, across many commodities and countries,
my reading of the evidence suggests that when spot prices are not
longer than 3–6 months out, futures prices are unbiased estimates of
future spot prices. 
Production Uncertainty
When production is uncertain, the correlation between production
and price uncertainty is crucial to any analysis. For a farmer producing
in the corn-belt, this correlation is likely significantly negative. To
illustrate why this covariance matters, consider a common description
of technology where production shocks enter production multiplica-
tively. When expected production is expanded, the marginal benefit in
terms of expected profit is expected price plus the covariance between
the production shock and price. Because we presume this covariance is
negative, firms will produce less output because the more output pro-
duced, the greater the reduction in profit on average. Further, increas-
ing the scale of production will increase the variance because the
variance of profit is proportional to the scale squared. Now we ask how
the possibility of a forward or futures contract affects hedging and pro-
duction choice. 
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Many authors have used mean-variance notions to calculate the
optimal hedge when both production and the price of output are uncer-
tain. Because price and production tend to be negatively correlated, the
optimal hedge under risk aversion is generally found to be less than
expected farm production.
Dynamics
The optimal dynamic hedge depends crucially on the evolution of
prices (time-series properties) and whether they are unbiased. If prices
are unbiased and production is certain, then reasonably simple dynam-
ics are implied in the optimal hedge (or ratio of hedge to production) in
most cases (Myers and Hanson 1996). When production is uncertain,
then strong assumptions are required in order to make much headway
on solving the problem (see references in Myers and Hanson).
Use of Futures and Forward Markets
Moschini and Hennessy (2001), citing a report from the U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office (1999), state that the available evidence is that
farmers use futures markets some but use forward markets frequently.
For farmers with sales exceeding $100,000, forward contracts were
used by 55 percent of farms and futures contracts or options were used
by 32 percent of farms. Patrick, Musser, and Eckman (1998) surveyed
large, well-educated, progressive Indiana farmers over a three-year
period on their use of forward and futures markets. Those who used
some form of forward contracts exceeded 75 percent. Use of futures
markets to hedge was limited to less than 25 percent for corn and soy-
beans and usually was less than 15 percent. My interpretation of the
general tone of much agricultural extension work seems to be: “futures
are a risk reduction tool that has been under-exploited.” However, it is
a very costly and imperfect mechanism for trading risk compared to
forward contracts—particularly where a large purchasing entity can
use the futures market to “lock in” price and then extend forward con-
tracts to farmers. 
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FOOD SAFETY
Consumer confidence about food safety has fallen precipitously in
recent times (Kramer 1990). This is likely due to highly publicized
occurrences in the 1980s and 1990s. The Alar and Chilean grapefruit
scares are examples of concern about chemical residues on produce. In
1993, an Escherichia coli outbreak in several fast-food restaurants
sickened hundreds of people and resulted in four deaths. In the summer
of 1997, there was a much-publicized case where 25 million pounds of
hamburger were produced with suspected E. coli contamination. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that
between 6.5 and 33 million people in the United States become ill each
year from food-borne pathogens, and that up to 9,000 die (Buzby et al.
1998). Of these cases of illness, more than 4,000 deaths may be associ-
ated with meat and poultry products. In addition, chemical residues
from fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides may pose long-term risks to
the public.
Safety policy is concerned with the delivery of existing foods
within some level of confidence that it is safe. It also extends to new
foodstuffs such as genetically modified organisms. We expect that the
usual marginal benefit–marginal cost calculations inform decision
making: absent externalities, the optimal level of care or safety is
where the marginal private benefit equals marginal private costs. The
marginal benefit could be modeled with expected utility or a mean
variance utility and the willingness to pay for each additional unit
increase in safety. Apparently, however, there are significant externali-
ties to other firms and consumers if a firm chooses a low level of
safety. Thus, because the optimal level of safety is where marginal
social benefit equals marginal social cost, private incentives as embod-
ied in supply and demand may not lead to the social optimum. Contrary
to the rhetoric often heard, this optimum will most often allow for
some contamination/risk.
Though measurement of each of these entities is not easy to do
well, there have been numerous attempts to shed light on the costs and
benefits of a policy proposal. The costs are relatively easy to conceptu-
alize and calculate. These are the additional costs to firms when safety
is efficiently increased. For a recent policy change by the Food Safety
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and Inspection Service (FSIS) called Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP), the costs are estimated to be at least $100
million annually. Antle (2000), studying meat-processing plants,
argues that these estimated costs are much too small due to the loss in
productive efficiency involved in complying with the HACCP regula-
tions. Any attempt to measure the costs of a regulation must count both
the direct costs of the program and the indirect costs due to the loss in
productive efficiency. 
Many estimates of the benefits have been much larger: $3.7 bil-
lion–$19.1 billion, depending on quantity and type of pathogens ame-
liorated and assumptions about the value of life. Cutting some corners,
the conceptual notion of willingness to pay (WTP) for food safety can
be illustrated using Equation (6.2) for a consumer. Let a consumer be
given a choice between two probability distributions. The current dis-
tribution possessed has a mean of $100 and a variance of a 500. The
second distribution has a mean of $96 and a variance of 400. The WTP
is the value that equates the following utilities:
U(100,500) = U(96 – WTP, 400).
(A more realistic depiction would embody not two means or variances
but two probability distributions of contamination.) It is the purchase
or demand price for the second probability distribution given that the
individual possesses the first one. In general, it can be positive or nega-
tive. The Food Safety and Inspection Service estimates of the yearly
public benefits using the cost of illness method (discussed below) are
$990 million–$3.7 billion. This wide range of numbers immediately
suggests the difficulty of measuring consumer benefits for the United
States.
The four methods used to estimate benefits are: 1) ask people in a
survey (contingent valuation, or CV method) how they would value an
increase in safety, 2) use experimental auctions to try to evaluate con-
sumer’s willingness to pay for improved safety (experimental method),
3) use cost of illness or liability as measure of consumer benefits, and
4) direct econometric estimation of the shift in demand functions con-
trolling for other factors (Caswell 1998; Buzby et al. 1998).
A few introductory comments will serve as background. Attempts
to measure econometrically the effects of food safety on consumer
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demand are fraught with measurement problems and often cannot
apply to a prospective program. If one had measures of food character-
istics, including safety attributes, then a regression of price on food
characteristics (hedonic regression) could yield the WTP for safety
changes. For example, as safety varied, the economist could measure
the effect on price. This marginal effect on price could be used to infer
WTP. However, one seldom has such data. Yet, it may be possible to
measure the impact of information or safety on demand. Further, some
economists make a distinction between safety claims by a manufac-
turer and scientific supportable claims. That is, if a manufacturer labels
eggs with a particularly low probability of Salmonella, and charges $x
more for them, is that the correct measure of the social value of
improved safety irrespective of scientific evidence of efficacy?
Applications of the Methods 
In the first method, surveys elicit a response to a hypothetical envi-
ronment. For example, one might propose a baseline probability of
food poisoning and severity and ask the respondent what they would be
willing to pay for a particular scenario of risk/severity reduction. This
is conceptually the most direct and appealing method, although there
may not be sufficient incentives and context for respondents to be
truthful. The second method need not rely on hypothetical scenarios,
but the experiment may not be representative of actual decision making
by the population at large (a sampling problem), or the experiment
itself may not represent the complexity of the environment and choice.
The third method often is not necessarily linked to WTP or social
value. For example, the cost of illness may not include pain and suffer-
ing and may miss the long-term consequences of illness on growth and
development. Liability may be a better measure, but it is not very help-
ful for a prospective evaluation of a policy. Either the cost of illness or
producer liability likely underreports the WTP for improved food
safety.
The empirical findings are interesting but often do not yet yield a
precise and consistent pattern (Shogren et al. 1999). Buzby et al.
(1998) discuss the following CV experiment. Store A is a conventional
U.S. grocery outlet, but store B eliminates or reduces, through testing,
the amount of pesticide residues on fresh produce. Store A is called
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pesticide-free and store B is set to government residue standards.
Demographic variables and a risk index that the respondent estimates
are included in the regressions. The only demographic variable that
was statistically significant was gender: women are more likely to shop
at store B and have a higher WTP. As expected, those who estimated
the risks from residues as being high were also more likely to shop at
store B and have a higher WTP. The median weekly WTPs for a gov-
ernment standard store and a pesticide-free store were $5.31 per week
and $5.88, respectively. Buzby, Ready, and Skees (1995) used CV to
measure the costs and benefits of eliminating a post-harvest chemical
sodium ortho-phenylphenate (SOPP) from use on Florida grapefruit
designated for the fresh markets. Sodium ortho-phenylphenate is a fun-
gicide that reduces molds and rots but is perceived by consumers to
have health risks. After calculating the costs (lost fruit) to the industry
from the ban, CV is used to calculate the WTP. Average WTP was
between $0.19 and $0.28, depending on what one assumed about the
WTP to nonrespondents. On average, respondents are willing to pay
about 38 percent more for SOPP-free grapefruit. Regression analysis
found no significant evidence that household size, race, or gender
affected WTP. More affluent and older people were found to have a
lower WTP. van Ravenswaay and Hoehn (1991) found that consumers
were willing to pay about 17 percent of the current purchase price to
avoid Alar in fresh apples.
In a typical experimental market, participants are given a choice
between a chicken sandwich with the usual chance of contamination by
Salmonella (probability of contamination may not be specified) if pur-
chased at a local outlet and a sandwich that is screened and is reported
to have 1/1,000,000 chance of contamination. Bids are in increments
over the price of the sandwich with the usual risk of contamination.
Similar experiments have been done in Arkansas, Massachusetts, Iowa,
and California. Incentives are put in place to obtain relevant bids. In
Arkansas and Massachusetts, average bids often exceeded $1, but in
Iowa, California, and Kansas the average was approximately $0.55 or
less for a given run of the experiment. It is unclear how one extrapo-
lates this to a countrywide cost/benefit calculation which includes non-
student participants.
The essence of the methodological difficulty involving eliciting
WTP is found in the excellent experimental study of Shogren et al.
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(1999). They designed an experiment where subjects chose irradiated
or nonirradiated chicken breasts. The price of nonirradiated chicken
breasts was held constant at $2.88/lb. The price of the irradiated
chicken breasts varied from a 10 percent discount ($2.59/lb.) to a 20
percent premium ($3.45/lb.). The first experiment involved actual
retail market trials with clear labeling and prominent display of USDA
summary data on food irradiation. In the second experiment, an experi-
mental auction was conducted. A budget of $30 was offered, and the
participants were asked to spend approximately $5.00 and keep the
rest. Briefly, after providing each participant with the USDA summary
data on irradiation, each participant responded with their preferred
choice. The final experiment was a random sample of 400 households
where the survey requested information on purchase behavior given
the same choices as in the retail and experimental markets. In the latter
case, a much more rich set of attitudinal, experience, and demographic
data were available to the researchers. 
There was general agreement among all three approaches in that
the demand for irradiated chicken is downward sloping. However,
informing market participants with the best available scientific infor-
mation (which is generally supportive to higher health and safety with
irradiation) led a significant percentage of customers to demand a 10
percent discount on irradiated chicken. Further, in this category
(requiring a 10 percent discount), there was a reasonably large (greater
than 33 percent) difference among the three methods in the percentage
that would purchase the treated chicken. The nature and explanation of
these anomalies are part of an ongoing debate (e.g., Bockstael 1999).
When it comes to the value of human life and safety, there are many
methodological and policy issues (Hooker, Nayga, and Siebert 1999).
The concluding question arising from these experiments is: “Based
upon available information, is consumer sovereignty to be respected
even if tastes and preferences conflict with accepted scientific evi-
dence?”
The last method is based upon secondary data. Henneberry, Piew-
thongngam, and Qiang (1999) tried to measure a risk information vari-
able and placed it in a system of demands for 14 major fresh produce
categories. The risk information variable was seldom statistically sig-
nificant but suggested an average percentage elasticity of 0.05–0.07
percent due to a marginal decrease in risk information. For example, a
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1 percent increase in the risk information index reduced crucifers, car-
rots, and foliage consumption by an average of 0.07 percent. However,
if high-frequency data are used with a specific risk, it appears that one
can establish through event studies the impact of contamination on
prices. For example, for specific USDA E. coli O157:H7 recalls, McK-
enzie and M.R. Thomsen (2001) established that prices (using daily
prices) for boneless beef react significantly to the recalls. This is the
most likely category affected by the bacteria. However, no such rela-
tionship can be established for the more aggregative categories of live
cattle and boxed beef prices.
CONCLUSION
It is a daunting task to try to summarize the content of risk research
in agriculture. Large areas of agricultural economic research have been
neglected: adoption of technology, storage, grading and standards, con-
tracting, environmental risks, finance, and others. Risk research per-
vades agricultural economic research because risk is pervasive in
agriculture. Biological and physical processes (such as weather) are so
complex that risk is often treated as endemic. This is not the only way
to view research. Perhaps more investment should be made to under-
stand these biological processes so that deterministic methods can be
coherently employed. My conclusion is that risk research in agricul-
tural economics has been a very fruitful intellectual endeavor. How-
ever, as is likely apparent throughout this chapter, I am not sure that the
profession has invested sufficient attention to carefully measuring
behavior. Normative prescriptions to government or individuals are
likely to mislead if there is no firm grounding in behavioral social sci-
ence knowledge. To be sure, there are some risk-related stylized facts
such as the econometric response of enterprise choices to changing
risk. However, there is much more work to be done in order to under-
stand whether many current interpretations of research results based on
aggregate data rests on firm micro-foundations.
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